We show that, under certain regularity conditions, if the distribution of income IS price independent and satisfies a condition on the shape of its graph, then total market demand, F(p), is monotone, i.e., given two positive prices p, and q, one has
INTRODUCTION
A satisfactory theory lillkillg the kllOWll microecollomic features of consumers and the assumed macroecollomic properties of aggregated systems is still missing. The major stumblillg block to filI the gap between these two fields, is how to find a way around Sonnenscheill's indeterminéLcy theorem. Sonnenschein's ( [15, 16, 17] ) result states that ally continuolls, mapping that satisfies Walras' law and is homogeneous of degree O, coincides with the excess demalld function of a certain economy.
This has some unpleasant consequences. One of these, is that it permits the theoretical possibility of many equilibria. Furthermore, it questions the regularity (in terms of smoothlless, like differentiability) of market demand and the stability of the equilibrium prices.
The problem of smoothness of market demand was satisfactorily attacked in [4] .
The authors there show that convelliently dispersed distributions of preferences and wealth lead to a continuous 01' even el demand function. The interested reader is referred to [18] for a survey on market demand in large economies with non-convex preferences and for instaures in which aggregation has a smoothiug effect.
Two main lines of research have dealt with the remaining issues. i.e. umqueness and stability uf equilibriulll prices. One of them was initiated by W. Hildenbrand ( [9] ) and developed by W. Hardle. W. Hildenbrand and M. Jerison in [8] . The gist of their method is to put restrictious uu the shapc of the distribution of income. The upshot of this approach is that one obtains that market demand is monotone (see Section below). In particular, this implies that market demand for a particular commodity is a decreasing function of its priee. ami that the weak axiom of revealed preference holds for the aggregatt>.
However, the restrictions imposed are rather stringent: Firstly, income is price ·independent. Moreover, it is assllllled that the dis,tribution of income has a continuous . .
non-increasing density with bOUllded support.
With respect to the first assumption, it has been extended to the case in which individual endowments are collinear ([9] , [1:3] ). In [1] , the second assumption has been relaxed, to other types of densities for the case of identical consumers the Engel curves of whom have a specific functional formo A second line uf argument has beell put forth by .1. M. Grandmont ([5] ). His approach is to impose rest.rictiolls on the ,<;hapt: 01 t/tr agents' chamcteristics rather than on the distributioll 01' income. In his work the use of a very particular linear structure on the space of demand functions, named the a-transform, is essential.
As a result the author proves very nice properties of the aggregate demand: market demalld has a dominant diagonal .Jacobian matrix and aggregate excess demand has the gross substituability property. It follows then that there is a unique equilibrium which is globally stable under the usual tatonnement process.
There are still some unsatisfactory features in the aforementioned viewpoint: One of them is that the way the a-transform is used does not have a straightforward economics illterpretation.
Further, the so-ca11ed hypothesis of agg1"f'.gatc dcsirability which also appears in a critical way, in the said \\'ol"k, is not sa.tisfied hy Illally 01' the wOl"king examples of demand models (e.g. CES, Diewert 01" Addilog). Even though one could argue that it rnay not be met individualIy and yet hold in the aggregate, it certainly puts sorne constraints on the type of demalld functiolls allowed.
The present work goes back to the first formulatioll. The key idea is again to control the "pathologies" of the illcome term in Slutskyls e<luation
where DF is the .Jacobia:n inatl'ix uf mean demand, S' ·is the ave~age Sluts~y cornpensated . . matrix and A is the average inconw matl'ix. We do this by way of conditions in the shape of eithel' illcome 01' initial endowments.
The novelty is twofold: First, in the case of price independent wealth, we allow for sorne increasing densities while the Law of Demand still holds for all prices. In particular, our result applies to some subfamily of lognormal distributions.
Secondly. for the case of pUl'e mal'ket exchange economies, we obtain uniqueness of price equilibrium all(llocal stability fol' the unique equilibrium, when initial endowrnents need not be necessarily collineal'.
If one imposes a further restriction on individual demand functions, then it lS possible to obtain global stability of the unique equilibrium.
Dne further characteristic of our present work, already present in [5] , is that the rnatrix A does not need to be positive semidefinite, i.e. it may have some negative eigenvalues. "Ve do make use however of the hypothesis that S is negative sernidefinite.
The papel' is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the problern of aggregation demand for a model in which income is indepelldent of prices. We introduce the notion of metonymy, which was airead)' present in the work of W. Hardle. W. Hildenbrand and 1\L .Jerison ([8] ) alld is also essential in the present one.
We pro\'e that if the the shape of tlw density of the distribution of income satisfies a certain restriction, the Law of Demand holds fol' all prices.
Essentially the same pl'oof shows that it is possible to obtaill the monotonicity of market demand fOf all prices by imposing that the second eigellvalue of the Slutsky compellsated tel'm be stl'ictly negative <1..-; l)l'ices go to the boulldary of the positive orthant, rOl' at least one agellt iu t,he enmomy. This is a conditioll on consurners' i preferences. It is satisfied, for example. if tlwre i~ at least one C()'ll~umer: w.ith a CES utility function.
In Section :3 \Ve apply these ideas to the setting in which income is determined by the market price of initial endowments. The Law of Demand cannot hold in this case.
However, a limited version of it can be shown, and this restricted variation is enough to yield uniqueness. By strengthenillg the assumptions, the weak axiom of revealed preference in the aggregate follows.
These properties 01' total Illal'ket dt'IlHI,lld haVt' éL countel'part in the stability of the model un del' a "Walrasian auctioneer" mechanisl11. In order to facilitatf' the reading all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The reader is referred tht'n~ also for au f'XplalléLtioll of the llotation llsed through out this work.
MARKET DEMAND
We consider an economy with n goods ami éL colltinuum of agellts. Consumers will be distinguished frOlll each other by their preferences ami incm;n~, which. for the moment , .
. wiII be assum'ed' to be exogeneously given. Typically, the chai'acteristics of each age~t in the economy will be determined by his individual demand function and income. (p,'w) and (p',w') 
Here p E IR.~+ denotes the vector of prices and w E ~ is the consumer's budget. Apart from differentiability of the demand functions, f(p, w), the other cooditioos can be derived if one assumes they at'ise from cOlltinuous, strictly convex alld oonsaturated preferellce relations.
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We will assume that the .hehavior of e~ch consumer is described by a. demand functioll as in the above definition (which may be taken as the solution to the usual individual utility maximization problem) and an income level. Here we assume income to be exogenously given and independent of prices. The general case, with income depending on prices wiJI be studied in the next Section.
A In this contexto at a given price system p, total demand is defined by
We assume that this integral is fillite, F(p), is differentiable and, furthermore, for p in the interior of the positive orthant we have, aF af
We sha11 enote by DF(1') the .Jacobian Illatrix of F at p. 
The Law of Demand is easily obtained if it holds for each individual Q at aH budgets. This is the case~ for exalúple, if individual demand functions ~re derived from homothetic preferences. Another instance in which the Law of Demand has been obtained, [9] , is for economies with identical consumers and a decreasing density of income. These results havt> been extended in [1] to a.n economy with identical consumers in which the Engel curves can be writtell as L~=o 9k(p )<Pk( w) and the functions <Pk( w) satisfy certain restrictions. Economies with agents not necessarily identical have been studied in [10] , agaill ullder the assumption of a decreasing density of income.
These may however be collsidered to be very restrictive cases. Furthermore, they do not seem to apply easily to tht> case of income dependent on prices, unless aH endowments are collinear. In this Section \Ve wiU be con cerned with other situations in which the Law of Demand holds.
RecaH now the Lernrna 2.4 Let G be a cont' of In-iccs. TIH: follo'Wing conditions arr equivalent (i) Thf Jacobian matl-ix DF(p) is Ilfgatillf semidrji.nite fOl' each p E G.
(
The proof is similar to the usual case (see [12] ), so we will omit it here. It is also a well known fact that the negative definiteness of D F(¡)) implies the strict lllonotonicity of total demand, F(p). We note, that the converse is not trut'.
For
is the set of consumers whose wealth is exactly w. The measure l' induces conditional distributions r¡w on B(w), for each w ami a probability measure. v on lf4 such that for any function 
Condition (ii) in the aboye definition is fulfilled if the conditional distributions 17w do not depend on w. This is the case if
in which (C,17) describes the distribution of types of consumers and (D,v) describes the distribution of wealth. Thus, the simplest case in which metonymy holds is if the distribution of types is the same at all income levels. This is not a necessary condition though, and it is also valid in many other instances. We refer the reader to [8] and [10] for a more detailed discussion of metonymy. Nevertheless, we remark that condition (ii) is equivalent to:
This function is eOlltinuous in aH the arguments for p E lR~+ ~ From the properties of the compensated demand fundion, it follo\Vs tll<Lt this fOI'l11 is llegative semidefinite. In fact, for Xo = 7,d1. ... 
Assume that ,X < O. Define also w= jw(a)dll E IR.+.
Consider now the folluwing quantity 
Let ! be dcjinfd by :1. The density distriblltioll is pien'wist' linear as given in Figure 1 . It attains its peak at the poillt too Suppose \Ve require tlmt tIJe total population with income less than to be a < 1, and assume that, for that sector, the distribution p is given by p(t) = ato A simple computation shows that given e as in Theorem 2.6, we may take to = ~:' a = ~ and tbis distribution satisfies J{p'>O} t p(t)
Example 2.9 It is possible to extelld the aboye result to llllimodal distributions. Namely, let p( w) be a ullimodal distribution, which attaillS its peak at the point
A simple calculatioll is therefore required to show that cOllditioll 2.9 in Theorem 2.6 is
Example 2.10 Fillally. \Ve apply Example 2.9 to the case of the lognormal distribution:
uJ2; x 2u'}.
"Ve find that this distributioll attaills its p~ak at the poillt t o = é'_(12 and condition 2.9 in 2.6 is satisfied for 'Ve llotice that Condition (iii), is a limitation on the consull1er's individual preferences rather than one on dispersion. However, it is enough that it be satisfied for one consumero Because, by continuity of >.(0), it is then verified for a set of consumers of positive measure. It is easily verified rOl' CES utilitiy functions. Hence Condition (iii) is fulfilled as long as tht>rt> is om' agent in the economy with CES-type preferences.
Remark 2.7 applies also here.
. MARKET EXCHANQE.ECONO·MIES
We now apply the ideas in the preceding section to a competitive pure exchange econorny.
Thus, each trader's inr.ome is now given by the market value of his own endowrnent and is. therefore, price dependent.
In this new context, a market exchange economy will be a triple
The only difference with the previous Section is that w E Ll (A, IR~) n C(A, R~), now represents initial endowments. ratlwr thall income. In other words. we suppose that
We let w = L w(a)dp.
denote the mean endowment. Total demand is defined by
)dp., (3.11) and the market. excess demand fundion is then -a (cr,p,p' w(cr) (ii) Por k = 1, ... , n, for all y E IR.
tI and for all priccs p, Note that if \Ve assume that the measure JL is a product-type measure of the form l' = 71 x v, as in the precedillg Sectioll, thell part (ii) follows from part (i). Namely,
, where, now (C, 17) describes the "types" of consumers alld (D, v) the allocation of initial endowments among each type. As in the price-indepelldellt case, it is easy to verify that condition (ii) is t'quivalent to the following one for all i,j, k
Our conditiollS 011 the shape of the distributio11 of initi,Ll endowments will be expressed by requirt'ments un the derivatives 01" lhe density g (8) . Considero
> .
·'lk
We will make use of tbe following rpsult, We can now state a restricted version of tbe Law of Demand. This will be enough, though, to guarantee lIniqlleness and will also provide stability of equilibrium in a closed cone of prices.
In order to exhibit the ftexibility oí our methods, we will consider now a slightly different variant of hypothesis (iii) in Theorem 2.6. Namely, we suppose that, for all consumers, the rallk oí the Slutsky nmtrix is the maximum it may have, i.e. we assume its rank is exactly n-l. In this case, the eigenvalues of S( Q, p, x) givell by 2.5, now have the formo (3.13)
Consider a dosed cone oí prices H e 1R~+. We Jet llOW (3.14) 
for all price.'1 p, q E 'H. with l' =f q and 11' W = q . w.
Remark 3.4 The prool' 01' Pl'Opositioll :3.:J shows that collditiol1 (iii) in it can be replaced by the following one:
Remark 3.5 The numbel' é appearillg in Proposition :l.a is computed usil1g data obtailled from the Slutsky IllCLtl'ix of all l~OnSUll)(~I·S. Hence, equatioll :3.16 restricts the shape of the graph of lhe .density dfstribution of income ac,o~ding to. the consumers' . .
taste.
As observed in Remark 2.7, the qualltity E depends, in principie on the density p.
It is also easy to verify from the pl"oof of PropositioB :3.:3 that if 1'rgttla1'. (ii) The mr.astu'C J.I. is mcto1LymÍt~.
(iv) For every C07Lsumer, the Slutsky matrix has mnk n-l. 
STABILITY AND A TATONNEMENT PROCESS
In this Section we suggest a pricp adjustment process which, for the economies considered, converges to the unique pquilihrium. COllsider the standard tatonnement process 
FINAL REMARKS
We have presented a model of apure e.xehange eeonomie system in which total market demand is monotone in priees. This allows ane to obtain results on uniqueness and stability of the equilibriull1 priet:'o
The aim of our work has been to do this through as realistic hypotheses as possible on the distribution of total expenditure and, at the same time, without imposing too restrictive conditions on cOllsumers' preferences. We WillllOW compare our results with the existing literature.
With respect to the line followed in [9] , [la] and [1] , the novelty here is that we allow for some illcreasing densities of income without making assumptions on the Engel curves.Our methods can be further extended to the more general setting in wich wealth is determined by the market price of illitial endowments.
The alternative approach to the problem of aggregation of demand. followed in
[5], makes rather strong assumptions on both, the consumers preferellces (aggregate desirability) and the distribution of 'c.hamcteristics' (the conditional densities in each class of o:-transfOl'm are all the same, and aH tlw agents in that dass have equal wealth).
In return, the author obta.ius tha.t oue does not lleed to make any reference to individual rationality other than homogeneity a.ml Walras' law.
hl the near future, it is hoped that empirica.l estimates will be obtained in order to test wbether the observable distriblltions sa.tisfy the hypotheses proposed here. It is also hoped that these findings will be extended so as to inc.orporate productioll, and a temporal framework.
APPENDIX
Let S~-l denote the positive orthant of the ullit sphere, S~-l = {x E R++ : l/xII = 1}, where n is the llumber of commodities.
We will use the followillg rOllvelltiollal llotatioll: 
Proof of lernrna 1:
Proof of Theorem 2.6: . 
S(a,p) -{st(a,p)}ij
We consider now the qUéLdratic forms,
. 
It is also enough to prove that (2; , Ot l(o'I', .., (o) )x¡p¡)dJl 
where we have used that 
Hence, we may assume that 1I;z: -xoll > ¡
The integral over the region n!(2w+l) {t : p'(t) :::; O} appearing in A.II is positive and will cause no problems. Thus we will concentrate on the region {t : p'( t) > O}.
Fix a price p E lR~+ ami define Hence, from the way e was rhosen, we have that IS(p,:r)l > A+ (p,:c) . Therefore, '(p,x) -A+(p,:¡:) < o. and the proof is finished.
'vVe start, now the prelimillaries to prove Pl'Oposition :1.:3. Let " { lR n" -. ) where Sij(a,p,p' w(a) ) éLre the entries of the Slutsky's matrix.
As before \Ve let 
It follows tbat a(p) (S(p,;z:) 
Let us define now the following quantitit.>.s, 
